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Externalities among advertisers in sponsored search

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dc.contributor.author Fotakis, D en
dc.contributor.author Krysta, P en
dc.contributor.author Telelis, O en
dc.date.accessioned 2014-03-01T02:53:17Z
dc.date.available 2014-03-01T02:53:17Z
dc.date.issued 2011 en
dc.identifier.issn 03029743 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/36208
dc.subject.other Click-through rate en
dc.subject.other Computational model en
dc.subject.other Computational results en
dc.subject.other Hardness of approximation en
dc.subject.other Negative correlation en
dc.subject.other Polynomial-time en
dc.subject.other Price mechanism en
dc.subject.other Relative order en
dc.subject.other Social welfare maximization en
dc.subject.other Sponsored searches en
dc.subject.other Winner determination problem en
dc.subject.other Game theory en
dc.subject.other Polynomial approximation en
dc.subject.other Approximation algorithms en
dc.title Externalities among advertisers in sponsored search en
heal.type conferenceItem en
heal.identifier.primary 10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_11 en
heal.identifier.secondary http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_11 en
heal.publicationDate 2011 en
heal.abstract We introduce a novel computational model for single-keyword auctions in sponsored search, which models explicitly externalities among advertisers, an aspect that has not been fully reflected in the existing models, and is known to affect the behavior of real advertisers. Our model takes into account both positive and negative correlations between any pair of advertisers, so that the click-through rate of an ad depends on the identity, relative order and distance of other ads appearing in the advertisements list. In the proposed model we present several computational results concerning the Winner Determination problem for Social Welfare maximization. These include hardness of approximation and polynomial time exact and approximation algorithms. We conclude with an evaluation of the Generalized Second Price mechanism in presence of externalities. © 2011 Springer-Verlag. en
heal.journalName Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) en
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_11 en
dc.identifier.volume 6982 LNCS en
dc.identifier.spage 105 en
dc.identifier.epage 116 en


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