The LNG market: A game theoretic approach to competition in LNG shipping

Gkonis, KG; Psaraftis, HN

dc.contributor.author	Gkonis, KG	en
dc.contributor.author	Psaraftis, HN	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T01:32:10Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T01:32:10Z
dc.date.issued	2009	en
dc.identifier.issn	1479-2931	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/20055
dc.subject	Game theory	en
dc.subject	LNG shipping	en
dc.subject	Oligopolistic competition	en
dc.title	The LNG market: A game theoretic approach to competition in LNG shipping	en
heal.type	journalArticle	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1057/mel.2009.2	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/mel.2009.2	en
heal.language	English	en
heal.publicationDate	2009	en
heal.abstract	The Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) trade is one of the most promising sectors in energy shipping. It is expected that competition will increasingly develop in the shipping segment of the LNG chain, which at least in its first phases will have the characteristics of an oligopolistic market. The LNG shipping market context is appropriate for the adoption of a (non-cooperative) game theoretic analysis framework to support decision-making. This paper focuses on oligopolistic competition in LNG shipping over the transportation capacity supplied to a trade route by competing shipping companies. It also examines the possibility of non-cooperative collusion among the competing parties, in order for them to share higher profits. The conclusions concern the optimal level of capacity supply by the competitors, under certain interaction settings, and the conditions under which they can sustain Pareto efficient equilibria. © 2009 Palgrave Macmillan.	en
heal.publisher	PALGRAVE MACMILLAN LTD	en
heal.journalName	Maritime Economics and Logistics	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1057/mel.2009.2	en
dc.identifier.isi	ISI:000208103000005	en
dc.identifier.volume	11	en
dc.identifier.issue	2	en
dc.identifier.spage	227	en
dc.identifier.epage	246	en