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An adaptive learning game model for interacting electric power markets

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dc.contributor.author Skoulidas, CC en
dc.contributor.author Vournas, CD en
dc.contributor.author Papavassilopoulos, GP en
dc.date.accessioned 2014-03-01T01:32:37Z
dc.date.available 2014-03-01T01:32:37Z
dc.date.issued 2010 en
dc.identifier.issn 0315-5986 en
dc.identifier.uri https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/20195
dc.subject Adaptive learning en
dc.subject deregulation en
dc.subject game theory en
dc.subject power markets en
dc.subject.classification Computer Science, Information Systems en
dc.subject.classification Operations Research & Management Science en
dc.subject.other Adaptive learning en
dc.subject.other Electric power markets en
dc.subject.other Energy prices en
dc.subject.other Interconnected systems en
dc.subject.other Interconnection capacity en
dc.subject.other Market operation en
dc.subject.other Nash games en
dc.subject.other Pay as bid en
dc.subject.other Pay-as-bid rule en
dc.subject.other Perfect competition en
dc.subject.other power markets en
dc.subject.other Price levels en
dc.subject.other Pricing methods en
dc.subject.other Simulation model en
dc.subject.other Uniform pricing en
dc.subject.other Behavioral research en
dc.subject.other Commerce en
dc.subject.other Competition en
dc.subject.other Computer simulation en
dc.subject.other Costs en
dc.subject.other Game theory en
dc.subject.other Learning algorithms en
dc.subject.other Profitability en
dc.subject.other Stochastic models en
dc.subject.other Deregulation en
dc.title An adaptive learning game model for interacting electric power markets en
heal.type journalArticle en
heal.identifier.primary 10.3138/infor.48.4.261 en
heal.identifier.secondary http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/infor.48.4.261 en
heal.language English en
heal.publicationDate 2010 en
heal.abstract In the present paper, a simulation model of two interacting electric power markets is being introduced, with or with no restriction in the interconnection capacity, in order to study the behavior of the energy price under two different pricing methods: Uniform Pricing and Pay-As-Bid. The model simulates the operation of the two markets as a stochastic adaptive Nash game, where players use a learning algorithm to maximize their profit and counterbalance their lack of information. The comparison of the results between the independent operation of the markets and the one of the interacting operation shows that lower prices are recorded when both interconnected systems apply Uniform Pricing and markets are oligopolies, whereas higher prices arise when both markets apply the pay-as-bid rule and tend towards perfect competition. In the case where the two interacting markets apply different pricing methods the differences observed in the independent market operation are blunted and prices tend to converge in intermediary price levels. Finally, constrained interconnection capacity leads to slightly higher prices at all instances. en
heal.publisher UNIV TORONTO PRESS INC en
heal.journalName INFOR en
dc.identifier.doi 10.3138/infor.48.4.261 en
dc.identifier.isi ISI:000290699800008 en
dc.identifier.volume 48 en
dc.identifier.issue 4 en
dc.identifier.spage 261 en
dc.identifier.epage 266 en


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