An adaptive learning game model for interacting electric power markets

Skoulidas, CC; Vournas, CD; Papavassilopoulos, GP

dc.contributor.author	Skoulidas, CC	en
dc.contributor.author	Vournas, CD	en
dc.contributor.author	Papavassilopoulos, GP	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T01:32:37Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T01:32:37Z
dc.date.issued	2010	en
dc.identifier.issn	0315-5986	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/20195
dc.subject	Adaptive learning	en
dc.subject	deregulation	en
dc.subject	game theory	en
dc.subject	power markets	en
dc.subject.classification	Computer Science, Information Systems	en
dc.subject.classification	Operations Research & Management Science	en
dc.subject.other	Adaptive learning	en
dc.subject.other	Electric power markets	en
dc.subject.other	Energy prices	en
dc.subject.other	Interconnected systems	en
dc.subject.other	Interconnection capacity	en
dc.subject.other	Market operation	en
dc.subject.other	Nash games	en
dc.subject.other	Pay as bid	en
dc.subject.other	Pay-as-bid rule	en
dc.subject.other	Perfect competition	en
dc.subject.other	power markets	en
dc.subject.other	Price levels	en
dc.subject.other	Pricing methods	en
dc.subject.other	Simulation model	en
dc.subject.other	Uniform pricing	en
dc.subject.other	Behavioral research	en
dc.subject.other	Commerce	en
dc.subject.other	Competition	en
dc.subject.other	Computer simulation	en
dc.subject.other	Costs	en
dc.subject.other	Game theory	en
dc.subject.other	Learning algorithms	en
dc.subject.other	Profitability	en
dc.subject.other	Stochastic models	en
dc.subject.other	Deregulation	en
dc.title	An adaptive learning game model for interacting electric power markets	en
heal.type	journalArticle	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.3138/infor.48.4.261	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/infor.48.4.261	en
heal.language	English	en
heal.publicationDate	2010	en
heal.abstract	In the present paper, a simulation model of two interacting electric power markets is being introduced, with or with no restriction in the interconnection capacity, in order to study the behavior of the energy price under two different pricing methods: Uniform Pricing and Pay-As-Bid. The model simulates the operation of the two markets as a stochastic adaptive Nash game, where players use a learning algorithm to maximize their profit and counterbalance their lack of information. The comparison of the results between the independent operation of the markets and the one of the interacting operation shows that lower prices are recorded when both interconnected systems apply Uniform Pricing and markets are oligopolies, whereas higher prices arise when both markets apply the pay-as-bid rule and tend towards perfect competition. In the case where the two interacting markets apply different pricing methods the differences observed in the independent market operation are blunted and prices tend to converge in intermediary price levels. Finally, constrained interconnection capacity leads to slightly higher prices at all instances.	en
heal.publisher	UNIV TORONTO PRESS INC	en
heal.journalName	INFOR	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.3138/infor.48.4.261	en
dc.identifier.isi	ISI:000290699800008	en
dc.identifier.volume	48	en
dc.identifier.issue	4	en
dc.identifier.spage	261	en
dc.identifier.epage	266	en