The evolutionary dynamics of audit

Anastasopoulos, NP; Anastasopoulos, MP

dc.contributor.author	Anastasopoulos, NP	en
dc.contributor.author	Anastasopoulos, MP	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T01:37:36Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T01:37:36Z
dc.date.issued	2012	en
dc.identifier.issn	0377-2217	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/21571
dc.subject	Auditing	en
dc.subject	Decision analysis	en
dc.subject	Dynamical systems	en
dc.subject	Economics	en
dc.subject	Evolutionary computations	en
dc.subject	Game theory	en
dc.subject.classification	Management	en
dc.subject.classification	Operations Research & Management Science	en
dc.subject.other	Analytical results	en
dc.subject.other	Asymptotically stable	en
dc.subject.other	Auditing	en
dc.subject.other	Critical issues	en
dc.subject.other	Detection problems	en
dc.subject.other	Evolutionary dynamics	en
dc.subject.other	Evolutionary game theory	en
dc.subject.other	Financial reporting	en
dc.subject.other	Financial reports	en
dc.subject.other	Two-player games	en
dc.subject.other	Decision theory	en
dc.subject.other	Dynamical systems	en
dc.subject.other	Economics	en
dc.subject.other	Evolutionary algorithms	en
dc.subject.other	Game theory	en
dc.subject.other	Industry	en
dc.subject.other	Management	en
dc.title	The evolutionary dynamics of audit	en
heal.type	journalArticle	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1016/j.ejor.2011.06.003	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2011.06.003	en
heal.language	English	en
heal.publicationDate	2012	en
heal.abstract	A critical issue in auditing is provisioning of reasonable assurance that the financial reports are free from material misstatements. The auditing detection problem can be viewed as a two-player game between the auditor and the auditee where the auditor aims at eliminating misstatements, reducing at the same time his audit efforts, while the auditee aims at benefiting from fraudulent financial reporting and defalcation. In this paper, the auditing/fraud detection problem is modeled employing evolutionary game theory. It is proved that, given that the players have accurate information for the parameters involved in the problem, the auditing/fraud detection game is stable but not asymptotically stable. The case of the auditor being partially informed about the auditee firm is also studied and it is concluded that if the auditor is partially informed about the auditee firm, a more comprehensive audit is necessary to guarantee quality of audit. Finally, analytical results are derived concerning the impact of audit tenure on audit quality. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.	en
heal.publisher	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV	en
heal.journalName	European Journal of Operational Research	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1016/j.ejor.2011.06.003	en
dc.identifier.isi	ISI:000296042400022	en
dc.identifier.volume	216	en
dc.identifier.issue	2	en
dc.identifier.spage	469	en
dc.identifier.epage	476	en