Sufficient conditions for Stackelberg and Nash strategies with memory

Papavassilopoulos, G; Cruz, J

dc.contributor.author	Papavassilopoulos, G	en
dc.contributor.author	Cruz, J	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T01:38:13Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T01:38:13Z
dc.date.issued	1980	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/21950
dc.subject	Cost Function	en
dc.subject	Differential Game	en
dc.title	Sufficient conditions for Stackelberg and Nash strategies with memory	en
heal.type	journalArticle	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1007/BF00934113	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00934113	en
heal.publicationDate	1980	en
heal.abstract	Sufficiency conditions for Stackelberg strategies for a class of deterministic differential games are derived when the players have recall of the previous trajectory. Sufficient conditions for Nash strategies when the players have recall of the trajectory are also derived. The state equation is linear, and the cost functional is quadratic. The admissible strategies are restricted to be affine in the	en
heal.journalName	Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/BF00934113	en