On linear-quadratic Gaussian continuous-time Nash games

Papavassilopoulos, G

dc.contributor.author	Papavassilopoulos, G	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T01:38:35Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T01:38:35Z
dc.date.issued	1984	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/22276
dc.subject	Continuous Time	en
dc.subject	Linear Quadratic	en
dc.subject	Linear Quadratic Gaussian	en
dc.title	On linear-quadratic Gaussian continuous-time Nash games	en
heal.type	journalArticle	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1007/BF00934565	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00934565	en
heal.publicationDate	1984	en
heal.abstract	Two classes of linear-quadratic Gaussian continuous-time Nash games are considered. Their main characteristic is that the s-fields with respect to which the control actions of the players have to be measurable at each instance of time are not affected by the past controls of the players. We show that, if a solution exists, then there exists a solution linear in	en
heal.journalName	Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/BF00934565	en