Performance versus informativeness in linear-quadratic Gaussian noncooperative games

Tu, M; Papavassilopoulos, G

dc.contributor.author	Tu, M	en
dc.contributor.author	Papavassilopoulos, G	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T01:39:21Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T01:39:21Z
dc.date.issued	1988	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/22724
dc.subject	Dynamic Game	en
dc.subject	Information Structure	en
dc.subject	linear functionals	en
dc.subject	noncooperative games	en
dc.subject	stackelberg game	en
dc.subject	kalman filter	en
dc.subject	Linear Quadratic Gaussian	en
dc.title	Performance versus informativeness in linear-quadratic Gaussian noncooperative games	en
heal.type	journalArticle	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1007/BF00939334	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00939334	en
heal.publicationDate	1988	en
heal.abstract	In this paper, we study the impact of informativeness on the performance of linear quadratic Gaussian Nash and Stackelberg games. We first show that, in two-person static Nash games, if one of the players acquires more information, then this extra information is beneficial to him, provided that it is orthogonal to both players' information. A special case is that when	en
heal.journalName	Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/BF00939334	en