Learning algorithms for repeated bimatrix Nash games with incomplete information

Papavassilopoulos, G

dc.contributor.author	Papavassilopoulos, G	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T01:39:32Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T01:39:32Z
dc.date.issued	1989	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/22856
dc.subject	Games With Incomplete Information	en
dc.subject	Learning Algorithm	en
dc.subject	Zero-sum Game	en
dc.subject	Nash Equilibrium	en
dc.title	Learning algorithms for repeated bimatrix Nash games with incomplete information	en
heal.type	journalArticle	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1007/BF00939817	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00939817	en
heal.publicationDate	1989	en
heal.abstract	The purpose of this paper is to study a particular recursive scheme for updating the actions of two players involved in a Nash game, who do not know the parameters of the game, so that the resulting costs and strategies converge to (or approach a neighborhood of) those that could be calculated in the known parameter case. We study this	en
heal.journalName	Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/BF00939817	en