Optimal Pricing Strategies in Noncooperative Networks

Korilis, Y; Varvarigou, T; Ahuja, S

dc.contributor.author	Korilis, Y	en
dc.contributor.author	Varvarigou, T	en
dc.contributor.author	Ahuja, S	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T01:45:43Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T01:45:43Z
dc.date.issued	1997	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/24696
dc.subject	Decentralized Control	en
dc.subject	Network Performance	en
dc.subject	Nash Equilibria	en
dc.title	Optimal Pricing Strategies in Noncooperative Networks	en
heal.type	journalArticle	en
heal.publicationDate	1997	en
heal.abstract	The complexity of modern networks, in terms of number of users and components, volume of traffic and diversity of supported applications, calls for decentralized control schemes where each user makes its control decisions independently based on some individual performance/cost objectives. The operating points of such &quot;noncooperative&quot; networks are the Nash equilibria of the underlying control game. Nash equilibria are generically	en