Selfish unsplittable flows

Fotakis, D; Kontogiannis, S; Spirakis, P

dc.contributor.author	Fotakis, D	en
dc.contributor.author	Kontogiannis, S	en
dc.contributor.author	Spirakis, P	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T01:54:21Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T01:54:21Z
dc.date.issued	2005	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/27337
dc.subject	Congestion Game	en
dc.subject	Network Congestion	en
dc.subject	Polynomial Time	en
dc.subject	Potential Game	en
dc.subject	Price of Anarchy	en
dc.subject	Quadratic Program	en
dc.subject	Nash Equilibria	en
dc.subject	Nash Equilibrium	en
dc.title	Selfish unsplittable flows	en
heal.type	journalArticle	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1016/j.tcs.2005.09.024	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2005.09.024	en
heal.publicationDate	2005	en
heal.abstract	Abstract What is the price of anarchy when unsplittable demands are routed selfishly in general networks with load - dependent edge delays? Motivated by this question we generalize the model of [14] to the case of weighted congestion games We show that varying demands of users crucially affect the nature of these games, which are no longer isomorphic to exact	en
heal.journalName	Theoretical Computer Science	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1016/j.tcs.2005.09.024	en