dc.contributor.author |
Fotakis, D |
en |
dc.date.accessioned |
2014-03-01T01:56:10Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2014-03-01T01:56:10Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2007 |
en |
dc.identifier.uri |
https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/27989 |
|
dc.subject |
Atomic Congestion Games |
en |
dc.subject |
Congestion Game |
en |
dc.subject |
Price of Anarchy |
en |
dc.subject |
Upper and Lower Bounds |
en |
dc.subject |
Nash Equilibria |
en |
dc.title |
Stackelberg Strategies for Atomic Congestion Games |
en |
heal.type |
journalArticle |
en |
heal.identifier.primary |
10.1007/978-3-540-75520-3_28 |
en |
heal.identifier.secondary |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-75520-3_28 |
en |
heal.publicationDate |
2007 |
en |
heal.abstract |
We investigate the effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games with unsplittable demands. In our setting, only a fraction of the players are selfish, while the rest are willing to follow a predetermined strategy. A Stackelberg strategy assigns the coordinated players to appropriately selected strategies trying to minimize the performance degradation due to the selfish players. We consider two |
en |
heal.journalName |
Theory of Computing Systems / Mathematical Systems Theory |
en |
dc.identifier.doi |
10.1007/978-3-540-75520-3_28 |
en |