Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths: Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy

Fotakis, D

dc.contributor.author	Fotakis, D	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T01:56:37Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T01:56:37Z
dc.date.issued	2008	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/28199
dc.subject	Best Response Dynamics	en
dc.subject	Congestion Game	en
dc.subject	Convergence Time	en
dc.subject	Linear Independence	en
dc.subject	Network Congestion	en
dc.subject	Price of Anarchy	en
dc.subject	Price of Stability	en
dc.subject	Nash Equilibrium	en
dc.title	Congestion Games with Linearly Independent Paths: Convergence Time and Price of Anarchy	en
heal.type	journalArticle	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_5	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_5	en
heal.publicationDate	2008	en
heal.abstract	We investigate the effect of linear independence in the strategies of congestion games on the con- vergence time of best improvement sequences and on the pure Price of Anarchy. In particular, we consider symmetric congestion games on extension-parallel networks, an interesting class of networks with linearly independent paths, and establish two remarkable properties previously known only for parallel-link games. More	en
heal.journalName	Theory of Computing Systems / Mathematical Systems Theory	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/978-3-540-79309-0_5	en