The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game

Fotakis, D; Kontogiannis, S; Koutsoupias, E; Mavronicolas, M; Spirakis, P

dc.contributor.author	Fotakis, D	en
dc.contributor.author	Kontogiannis, S	en
dc.contributor.author	Koutsoupias, E	en
dc.contributor.author	Mavronicolas, M	en
dc.contributor.author	Spirakis, P	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T01:58:18Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T01:58:18Z
dc.date.issued	2009	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/28666
dc.subject	Algorithmic Game Theory	en
dc.subject	Computational Complexity	en
dc.subject	Efficient Algorithm	en
dc.subject	Mixed Strategy	en
dc.subject	Network Congestion	en
dc.subject	Probability Distribution	en
dc.subject	Selfish Routing	en
dc.subject	Nash Equilibria	en
dc.subject	Nash Equilibrium	en
dc.title	The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game	en
heal.type	journalArticle	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1016/j.tcs.2008.01.004	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2008.01.004	en
heal.publicationDate	2009	en
heal.abstract	In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models selfish routing over a network consisting of m parallel links. We assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over links, to control the routing of her own traffic. In a	en
heal.journalName	Theoretical Computer Science	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1016/j.tcs.2008.01.004	en