dc.contributor.author |
Panaousis, EA |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
Politis, C |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
Polyzos, GC |
en |
dc.date.accessioned |
2014-03-01T01:58:48Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2014-03-01T01:58:48Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2009 |
en |
dc.identifier.issn |
15566072 |
en |
dc.identifier.uri |
https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/28730 |
|
dc.subject.other |
Access points |
en |
dc.subject.other |
Bisection method |
en |
dc.subject.other |
Nash bargaining solution |
en |
dc.subject.other |
Nash Equilibrium |
en |
dc.subject.other |
Pilot signals |
en |
dc.subject.other |
Power control game |
en |
dc.subject.other |
Transmission power |
en |
dc.subject.other |
Access control |
en |
dc.subject.other |
Gain measurement |
en |
dc.subject.other |
Power control |
en |
dc.subject.other |
Power spectrum |
en |
dc.subject.other |
Power transmission |
en |
dc.subject.other |
Game theory |
en |
dc.title |
Power control using game theory in a shared open spectrum |
en |
heal.type |
journalArticle |
en |
heal.identifier.primary |
10.1109/MVT.2009.933473 |
en |
heal.identifier.secondary |
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/MVT.2009.933473 |
en |
heal.identifier.secondary |
5226938 |
en |
heal.publicationDate |
2009 |
en |
heal.abstract |
A method to control the transmission power of the access point (AP) pilot signals using game theory, is discussed. The power transmission level of each AP as a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the NPG is computed, and it is assumed that the operators are cooperative. The case of a cooperative power control game (CPG) is also examined, where the existence of a central authority called game regulator is assumed. The bisection method is used to derive the Nash bargaining solution (NBS). The NBS is a point where the utilities of the two cooperative APs are maximized and is announced by the game regulator to the APs. The game regulator calculates the NBS considering the system parameters, namely, the link gains between the APs and their associated clients. A single reduction step is needed to achieve the NBS in the CPG, assuming that all the entities are not cheaters, and they reduce their power to the value announced by the game regulator. In addition, the simulation concludes that the final mean utility in the CPG is higher than the mean utility in the NPG. |
en |
heal.journalName |
IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine |
en |
dc.identifier.doi |
10.1109/MVT.2009.933473 |
en |
dc.identifier.volume |
4 |
en |
dc.identifier.issue |
3 |
en |
dc.identifier.spage |
33 |
en |
dc.identifier.epage |
39 |
en |