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Power control using game theory in a shared open spectrum

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dc.contributor.author Panaousis, EA en
dc.contributor.author Politis, C en
dc.contributor.author Polyzos, GC en
dc.date.accessioned 2014-03-01T01:58:48Z
dc.date.available 2014-03-01T01:58:48Z
dc.date.issued 2009 en
dc.identifier.issn 15566072 en
dc.identifier.uri https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/28730
dc.subject.other Access points en
dc.subject.other Bisection method en
dc.subject.other Nash bargaining solution en
dc.subject.other Nash Equilibrium en
dc.subject.other Pilot signals en
dc.subject.other Power control game en
dc.subject.other Transmission power en
dc.subject.other Access control en
dc.subject.other Gain measurement en
dc.subject.other Power control en
dc.subject.other Power spectrum en
dc.subject.other Power transmission en
dc.subject.other Game theory en
dc.title Power control using game theory in a shared open spectrum en
heal.type journalArticle en
heal.identifier.primary 10.1109/MVT.2009.933473 en
heal.identifier.secondary http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/MVT.2009.933473 en
heal.identifier.secondary 5226938 en
heal.publicationDate 2009 en
heal.abstract A method to control the transmission power of the access point (AP) pilot signals using game theory, is discussed. The power transmission level of each AP as a Nash equilibrium (NE) of the NPG is computed, and it is assumed that the operators are cooperative. The case of a cooperative power control game (CPG) is also examined, where the existence of a central authority called game regulator is assumed. The bisection method is used to derive the Nash bargaining solution (NBS). The NBS is a point where the utilities of the two cooperative APs are maximized and is announced by the game regulator to the APs. The game regulator calculates the NBS considering the system parameters, namely, the link gains between the APs and their associated clients. A single reduction step is needed to achieve the NBS in the CPG, assuming that all the entities are not cheaters, and they reduce their power to the value announced by the game regulator. In addition, the simulation concludes that the final mean utility in the CPG is higher than the mean utility in the NPG. en
heal.journalName IEEE Vehicular Technology Magazine en
dc.identifier.doi 10.1109/MVT.2009.933473 en
dc.identifier.volume 4 en
dc.identifier.issue 3 en
dc.identifier.spage 33 en
dc.identifier.epage 39 en


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