Stackelberg Strategies for Atomic Congestion Games

Fotakis, D

dc.contributor.author	Fotakis, D	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T01:59:33Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T01:59:33Z
dc.date.issued	2010	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/28964
dc.subject	Atomic Congestion Games	en
dc.subject	Congestion Game	en
dc.subject	Price of Anarchy	en
dc.subject	Upper and Lower Bounds	en
dc.subject	Upper Bound	en
dc.subject	Lower Bound	en
dc.subject	Nash Equilibria	en
dc.title	Stackelberg Strategies for Atomic Congestion Games	en
heal.type	journalArticle	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1007/s00224-008-9152-8	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00224-008-9152-8	en
heal.publicationDate	2010	en
heal.abstract	We investigate the effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games with unsplittable demands. In our setting, only a fraction of the players are selfish, while the rest are willing to follow a predetermined strategy. A Stackelberg strategy assigns the coordinated players to appropriately selected strategies trying to minimize the performance degradation due to the selfish players. We consider two	en
heal.journalName	Theory of Computing Systems / Mathematical Systems Theory	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/s00224-008-9152-8	en