Selfish Unsplittable Flows

Fotakis, D; Kontogiannis, S; Spirakis, P

dc.contributor.author	Fotakis, D	en
dc.contributor.author	Kontogiannis, S	en
dc.contributor.author	Spirakis, P	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T02:42:58Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T02:42:58Z
dc.date.issued	2004	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/31154
dc.subject	Network Congestion	en
dc.subject	Potential Game	en
dc.subject	Price of Anarchy	en
dc.title	Selfish Unsplittable Flows	en
heal.type	conferenceItem	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1007/978-3-540-27836-8_51	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-27836-8_51	en
heal.publicationDate	2004	en
heal.abstract	Abstract: What is the price of anarchy when unsplittable demands are routedselfishly in general networks with load-dependent edge delays? Motivated bythis question we generalize the model of [14] to the case of weighted congestiongames. We show that varying demands of users crucially affect the nature of thesegames, which are no longer isomorphic to exact potential games, even for verysimple instances.	en
heal.journalName	International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/978-3-540-27836-8_51	en