Selfish routing and path coloring in all-optical networks

Milis, I; Pagourtzis, A; Potika, K

dc.contributor.author	Milis, I	en
dc.contributor.author	Pagourtzis, A	en
dc.contributor.author	Potika, K	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T02:44:57Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T02:44:57Z
dc.date.issued	2007	en
dc.identifier.issn	03029743	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/32041
dc.subject	All Optical Network	en
dc.subject	Competitive Ratio	en
dc.subject	non-cooperative game	en
dc.subject	Price of Anarchy	en
dc.subject	Ring Network	en
dc.subject	Selfish Routing	en
dc.subject	Upper and Lower Bounds	en
dc.subject	First Fit	en
dc.subject	Lower Bound	en
dc.subject.other	Algorithms	en
dc.subject.other	Functions	en
dc.subject.other	Game theory	en
dc.subject.other	Network routing	en
dc.subject.other	Online systems	en
dc.subject.other	Non-cooperative games	en
dc.subject.other	Online routing	en
dc.subject.other	Path coloring	en
dc.subject.other	Selfish Routing	en
dc.subject.other	Fiber optic networks	en
dc.title	Selfish routing and path coloring in all-optical networks	en
heal.type	conferenceItem	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1007/978-3-540-77294-1_8	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77294-1_8	en
heal.publicationDate	2007	en
heal.abstract	We study routing and path coloring problems in all-optical networks as non-cooperative games. We especially focus on oblivious payment functions, that is, functions that charge a player according to her own strategy only. We first strengthen a known relation between such games and online routing and path coloring. In particular, we show that the price of anarchy of such games is lower-bounded by, and in several cases precisely equal to, the competitive ratio of appropriate modifications of the First Fit algorithm. Based on this framework we provide results for two classes of games in ring networks: in Selfish Routing and Path Coloring a player must determine both a routing and a coloring for her request, while in Selfish Path Coloring the routing is predetermined and only a coloring of requests needs to be specified. We prove specific upper and lower bounds on the price of anarchy of these games under various payment functions. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2007.	en
heal.journalName	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/978-3-540-77294-1_8	en
dc.identifier.volume	4852 LNCS	en
dc.identifier.spage	71	en
dc.identifier.epage	84	en