Genetic computation of road network design and pricing stackelberg games with multi-class users

Dimitriou, L; Tsekeris, T; Stathopoulos, A

dc.contributor.author	Dimitriou, L	en
dc.contributor.author	Tsekeris, T	en
dc.contributor.author	Stathopoulos, A	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T02:45:17Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T02:45:17Z
dc.date.issued	2008	en
dc.identifier.issn	03029743	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/32260
dc.subject	Equilibrium network design	en
dc.subject	Genetic algorithms	en
dc.subject	Regulated private highways	en
dc.subject	Road pricing	en
dc.subject	Stackelberg games	en
dc.subject.other	Computation theory	en
dc.subject.other	Computer graphics	en
dc.subject.other	Economics	en
dc.subject.other	Highway engineering	en
dc.subject.other	Highway systems	en
dc.subject.other	Laws and legislation	en
dc.subject.other	Motor transportation	en
dc.subject.other	Nonlinear programming	en
dc.subject.other	Roads and streets	en
dc.subject.other	Stochastic programming	en
dc.subject.other	Discrete variables	en
dc.subject.other	European	en
dc.subject.other	Evolutionary computation (EC)	en
dc.subject.other	Evolutionary computing	en
dc.subject.other	Global search	en
dc.subject.other	Government regulations	en
dc.subject.other	Heidelberg (CO)	en
dc.subject.other	Highway capacity	en
dc.subject.other	Nonconvex	en
dc.subject.other	Nonlinear programs	en
dc.subject.other	Optimal capacity	en
dc.subject.other	Pricing decisions	en
dc.subject.other	Pricing strategies	en
dc.subject.other	Road networks	en
dc.subject.other	Solution procedures	en
dc.subject.other	Stackelberg games	en
dc.subject.other	Game theory	en
dc.title	Genetic computation of road network design and pricing stackelberg games with multi-class users	en
heal.type	conferenceItem	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1007/978-3-540-78761-7_73	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78761-7_73	en
heal.publicationDate	2008	en
heal.abstract	This paper deals with the problems of optimal capacity and pricing decisions in private road networks. These problems are described as a class of design and pricing Stackelberg games and formulated as nonconvex, bilevel nonlinear programs. Such games capture interactions among the decisions of system designer/operator, government regulations and reactions of multi-class users on optimal toll-capacity combinations. The present class of games applies to a realistic urban highway with untolled alternative arterial links. In contrast with the mostly used continuous representations, the highway capacity is more intuitively expressed as a discrete variable, which further complicates the solution procedure. Hence, an evolutionary computing approach is employed to provide a stochastic global search of the optimal toll and capacity choices. The results offer valuable insights into how investment and pricing strategies can be deployed in regulated private road networks. © 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.	en
heal.journalName	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/978-3-540-78761-7_73	en
dc.identifier.volume	4974 LNCS	en
dc.identifier.spage	669	en
dc.identifier.epage	678	en