On the existence of optimal taxes for network congestion games with heterogeneous users

Fotakis, D; Karakostas, G; Kolliopoulos, SG

dc.contributor.author	Fotakis, D	en
dc.contributor.author	Karakostas, G	en
dc.contributor.author	Kolliopoulos, SG	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T02:46:53Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T02:46:53Z
dc.date.issued	2010	en
dc.identifier.issn	03029743	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/32924
dc.subject	Design Optimization	en
dc.subject	Network Congestion	en
dc.subject	Network Game	en
dc.subject	Selfish Routing	en
dc.subject.other	Finite number	en
dc.subject.other	Heterogeneous users	en
dc.subject.other	Network congestion game	en
dc.subject.other	Network edges	en
dc.subject.other	Network game	en
dc.subject.other	Non-cooperative	en
dc.subject.other	Optimal taxes	en
dc.subject.other	Selfish routing	en
dc.subject.other	Selfish users	en
dc.subject.other	Traffic demands	en
dc.subject.other	Optimization	en
dc.subject.other	Taxation	en
dc.subject.other	Game theory	en
dc.title	On the existence of optimal taxes for network congestion games with heterogeneous users	en
heal.type	conferenceItem	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_15	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_15	en
heal.publicationDate	2010	en
heal.abstract	We consider network congestion games in which a finite number of non-cooperative users select paths. The aim is to mitigate the inefficiency caused by the selfish users by introducing taxes on the network edges. A tax vector is strongly (weakly)-optimal if all (at least one of) the equilibria in the resulting game minimize(s) the total latency. The issue of designing optimal tax vectors for selfish routing games has been studied extensively in the literature. We study for the first time taxation for networks with atomic users which have unsplittable traffic demands and are heterogeneous, i.e., have different sensitivities to taxes. On the positive side, we show the existence of weakly-optimal taxes for single-source network games. On the negative side, we show that the cases of homogeneous and heterogeneous users differ sharply as far as the existence of strongly-optimal taxes is concerned: there are parallel-link games with linear latencies and heterogeneous users that do not admit strongly-optimal taxes. © 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.	en
heal.journalName	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4_15	en
dc.identifier.volume	6386 LNCS	en
dc.identifier.issue	M4D	en
dc.identifier.spage	162	en
dc.identifier.epage	173	en