Winner-imposing strategyproof mechanisms for multiple facility location games

Fotakis, D; Tzamos, C

dc.contributor.author	Fotakis, D	en
dc.contributor.author	Tzamos, C	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T02:47:13Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T02:47:13Z
dc.date.issued	2010	en
dc.identifier.issn	03029743	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/33021
dc.subject	Facility Location	en
dc.subject	Metric Space	en
dc.subject	Randomized Algorithm	en
dc.subject.other	Approximation ratios	en
dc.subject.other	Connection-costs	en
dc.subject.other	Facility locations	en
dc.subject.other	Metric spaces	en
dc.subject.other	Randomized Algorithms	en
dc.subject.other	Social cost	en
dc.subject.other	Strategy proofs	en
dc.subject.other	Strategyproof mechanism	en
dc.subject.other	Approximation algorithms	en
dc.subject.other	Internet	en
dc.subject.other	Topology	en
dc.subject.other	Wine	en
dc.subject.other	Economics	en
dc.title	Winner-imposing strategyproof mechanisms for multiple facility location games	en
heal.type	conferenceItem	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_19	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_19	en
heal.publicationDate	2010	en
heal.abstract	We study Facility Location games, where a number of facilities are placed in a metric space based on locations reported by strategic agents. A mechanism maps the agents' locations to a set of facilities. The agents seek to minimize their connection cost, namely the distance of their true location to the nearest facility, and may misreport their location. We are interested in mechanisms that are strategyproof, i.e., ensure that no agent can benefit from misreporting her location, do not resort to monetary transfers, and approximate the optimal social cost. We focus on the closely related problems of k-Facility Location and Facility Location with a uniform facility opening cost, and mostly study winner-imposing mechanisms, which allocate facilities to the agents and require that each agent allocated a facility should connect to it. We show that the winner-imposing version of the Proportional Mechanism (Lu et al., EC '10) is stategyproof and 4k-approximate for the k-Facility Location game. For the Facility Location game, we show that the winner-imposing version of the randomized algorithm of (Meyerson, FOCS '01), which has an approximation ratio of 8, is strategyproof. Furthermore, we present a deterministic non-imposing group strategyproof O(logn)-approximate mechanism for the Facility Location game on the line. © 2010 Springer-Verlag.	en
heal.journalName	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_19	en
dc.identifier.volume	6484 LNCS	en
dc.identifier.spage	234	en
dc.identifier.epage	245	en