Stochastic quadratic Nash and leader-follower games

Papavassilopoulos, G

dc.contributor.author	Papavassilopoulos, G	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T02:47:32Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T02:47:32Z
dc.date.issued	1980	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/33213
dc.subject	Random Variable	en
dc.title	Stochastic quadratic Nash and leader-follower games	en
heal.type	conferenceItem	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1109/CDC.1980.271990	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/CDC.1980.271990	en
heal.publicationDate	1980	en
heal.abstract	In this paper we study and solve completely the static Nash and Leader-Follower games where the players have quadratic costs and linear measurements of a random variable which enters linearly into the costs, see (1)- (7). Several dynamic cases are included in the static formulation as long as appropriate nestedness conditions [4] are imposed on the information of the players.	en
heal.journalName	Conference on Decision and Control	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1109/CDC.1980.271990	en