Incentive-Compatible Pricing Strategies in Noncooperative Networks

Korilis, Y; Varvarigou, T; Ahuja, S

dc.contributor.author	Korilis, Y	en
dc.contributor.author	Varvarigou, T	en
dc.contributor.author	Ahuja, S	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T02:48:37Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T02:48:37Z
dc.date.issued	1998	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/33958
dc.subject	Decentralized Control	en
dc.subject	Incentive Compatibility	en
dc.subject	Network Performance	en
dc.subject	Nash Equilibria	en
dc.title	Incentive-Compatible Pricing Strategies in Noncooperative Networks	en
heal.type	conferenceItem	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1109/INFCOM.1998.665060	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/INFCOM.1998.665060	en
heal.publicationDate	1998	en
heal.abstract	The complexity of modern networks calls for decentralized control schemes where each user makes its control decisions independently based on some individual performance objectives. The operating points of such noncooperative networks are the Nash equilibria of the underlying control game. Nash equilibria are generically inefficient and lead to suboptimal network performance. Using routing as a control paradigm, a methodology is	en
heal.journalName	IEEE INFOCOM	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1109/INFCOM.1998.665060	en