dc.contributor.author |
Tzafestas, E |
en |
dc.date.accessioned |
2014-03-01T02:49:01Z |
|
dc.date.available |
2014-03-01T02:49:01Z |
|
dc.date.issued |
2000 |
en |
dc.identifier.uri |
https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/34223 |
|
dc.subject |
Cooperative Behavior |
en |
dc.subject |
iterated prisoner's dilemma |
en |
dc.subject |
Temporal Dynamics |
en |
dc.subject |
Tit for Tat |
en |
dc.title |
Toward Adaptive Cooperative Behavior |
en |
heal.type |
conferenceItem |
en |
heal.publicationDate |
2000 |
en |
heal.abstract |
We analyze the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the performance of GRADUAL, the best behavior found so far. This behavior has the undesirable property of permanent memory, which would be detrimental for stability. As a solution to the permanent memory problem, we propose an adaptive tit-for-tat behavior that uses a self-regulated estimate of the opponent's friendliness. On a second level, we |
en |
heal.journalName |
Simulation of Adaptive Behavior |
en |