The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game

Fotakis, D; Kontogiannis, S; Koutsoupias, E; Mavronicolas, M; Spirakis, P

dc.contributor.author	Fotakis, D	en
dc.contributor.author	Kontogiannis, S	en
dc.contributor.author	Koutsoupias, E	en
dc.contributor.author	Mavronicolas, M	en
dc.contributor.author	Spirakis, P	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T02:49:11Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T02:49:11Z
dc.date.issued	2002	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/34389
dc.subject	Computational Complexity	en
dc.subject	Mixed Strategy	en
dc.subject	Network Congestion	en
dc.subject	Probability Distribution	en
dc.subject	Selfish Routing	en
dc.subject	Nash Equilibria	en
dc.subject	Nash Equilibrium	en
dc.title	The Structure and Complexity of Nash Equilibria for a Selfish Routing Game	en
heal.type	conferenceItem	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1007/3-540-45465-9_12	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45465-9_12	en
heal.publicationDate	2002	en
heal.abstract	In this work, we study the combinatorial structure and the computational complexity of Nash equilibria for a certain game that models selfish routing over a network consisting of m parallel links .W e assume a collection of n users, each employing a mixed strategy, which is a probability distribution over links, to control the routing of its own assigned traffic	en
heal.journalName	International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/3-540-45465-9_12	en