Symmetry in Network Congestion Games: Pure Equilibria and Anarchy Cost

Fotakis, D; Kontogiannis, S; Spirakis, P

dc.contributor.author	Fotakis, D	en
dc.contributor.author	Kontogiannis, S	en
dc.contributor.author	Spirakis, P	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T02:49:58Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T02:49:58Z
dc.date.issued	2005	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/34829
dc.subject	Network Congestion	en
dc.subject	Network Traffic	en
dc.subject	Path Selection	en
dc.subject	Price of Anarchy	en
dc.subject	Traffic Congestion	en
dc.subject	Nash Equilibria	en
dc.subject	Series Parallel	en
dc.subject	Shortest Path	en
dc.title	Symmetry in Network Congestion Games: Pure Equilibria and Anarchy Cost	en
heal.type	conferenceItem	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1007/11671411_13	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11671411_13	en
heal.publicationDate	2005	en
heal.abstract	We study computational and coordination efficiency issues of Nash equilibria in symmetric network congestion games. We first propose a simple and natural greedy method that computes a pure Nash equi- librium with respect to traffic congestion in a network. In this algorithm each user plays only once and allocates her traffic to a path selected via a shortest path computation.	en
heal.journalName	Workshop on Approximation and Online Algorithms	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/11671411_13	en