Atomic Congestion Games Among Coalitions

Fotakis, D; Kontogiannis, S; Spirakis, P

dc.contributor.author	Fotakis, D	en
dc.contributor.author	Kontogiannis, S	en
dc.contributor.author	Spirakis, P	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T02:50:15Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T02:50:15Z
dc.date.issued	2006	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/34982
dc.subject	Atomic Congestion Games	en
dc.subject	Game Theory	en
dc.subject	Polynomial Time	en
dc.subject	Price of Anarchy	en
dc.subject	Nash Equilibria	en
dc.subject	Nash Equilibrium	en
dc.title	Atomic Congestion Games Among Coalitions	en
heal.type	conferenceItem	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1007/11786986_50	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11786986_50	en
heal.publicationDate	2006	en
heal.abstract	We consider algorithmic questions concerning the existence, tractability and quality of atomic congestion games, among users that are considered to participate in (static) selfish coalitions. We carefully define a coalitional congestion model among atomic players. Our findings in this model are quite interesting, in the sense that we demonstrate many similarities with the non-cooperative case. For exam- ple, there exist	en
heal.journalName	International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/11786986_50	en