Early Commitment and Entry Deterrence in an LNG shipping market

Gkonis, KG; Psaraftis, HN

dc.contributor.author	Gkonis, KG	en
dc.contributor.author	Psaraftis, HN	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T02:51:36Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T02:51:36Z
dc.date.issued	2008	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/35584
dc.relation.uri	http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-77956305094&partnerID=40&md5=83059f32dca9ba2bb76ece5d3c59a122	en
dc.subject	Early Commitment	en
dc.subject	Entry Deterrence	en
dc.subject	Game theory	en
dc.subject	LNG shipping	en
dc.subject	Strategic decision-making	en
dc.subject.other	Early Commitment	en
dc.subject.other	Entry deterrence	en
dc.subject.other	LNG shipping	en
dc.subject.other	Non-cooperative	en
dc.subject.other	Shipping market	en
dc.subject.other	Strategic decisions	en
dc.subject.other	Strategic interactions	en
dc.subject.other	Strategic investments	en
dc.subject.other	Strategic positioning	en
dc.subject.other	Theoretic analysis	en
dc.subject.other	Commerce	en
dc.subject.other	Decision theory	en
dc.subject.other	Economics	en
dc.subject.other	Game theory	en
dc.subject.other	Investments	en
dc.subject.other	Liquefied natural gas	en
dc.subject.other	Profitability	en
dc.subject.other	Ships	en
dc.subject.other	Decision making	en
dc.title	Early Commitment and Entry Deterrence in an LNG shipping market	en
heal.type	conferenceItem	en
heal.publicationDate	2008	en
heal.abstract	The LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) trade is one of the most promising sectors in energy shipping. An important characteristic of the LNG shipping market is its oligopolistic structure. The market actors make their decisions independently, yet knowing that these decisions are likely to influence the strategic positioning of the other players. This context is appropriate for the adoption of a (non-cooperative) game theoretic analysis framework to support decision-making. Two topics of strategic decision-making in LNG shipping are investigated in this paper, namely Early Commitment and Entry Deterrence. Early Commitment has to do with the rationale that may justify an early strategic investment commitment (it may also be encountered as ""pre-commitment"") . In an LNG shipping market such a pre-commitment could be an order of (uncommitted) LNG vessels to be launched in the market in a future point in time. Entry Deterrence is a strategic interaction between a monopolist LNG shipowner in a specific market (the incumbent) and a potential entrant or entrants in that market. The entrants offer identical or close substitute products (services), i.e. the LNG cargoes shipping service. If they enter the market, then the incumbent's profits are reduced, so the incumbent - monopolist tries to prevent other firms from entering the market. First, a traditional approach to such a strategic interaction is discussed and it is explained why it is unsatisfactory. Then, it is presented how game theory provides a more sophisticated treatment of the subject, and the previously developed early commitment concepts are also utilised for this purpose.	en
heal.journalName	2nd International Symposium on Ship Operations, Management and Economics 2008	en
dc.identifier.spage	74	en
dc.identifier.epage	84	en