A budget-based cost-effective incentive model

Wei, G; Xie, M; Mao, Y; Vasilakos, AV

dc.contributor.author	Wei, G	en
dc.contributor.author	Xie, M	en
dc.contributor.author	Mao, Y	en
dc.contributor.author	Vasilakos, AV	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T02:51:54Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T02:51:54Z
dc.date.issued	2009	en
dc.identifier.issn	15302016	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/35738
dc.subject	Budget	en
dc.subject	Fairness	en
dc.subject	Incentive	en
dc.subject	Profit model	en
dc.subject.other	BitTorrent	en
dc.subject.other	Download time	en
dc.subject.other	Incentive mechanism	en
dc.subject.other	Market equilibria	en
dc.subject.other	P2P network	en
dc.subject.other	Profit model	en
dc.subject.other	TCP protocol	en
dc.subject.other	Three phasis	en
dc.subject.other	Work-load models	en
dc.subject.other	Budget control	en
dc.subject.other	Distributed computer systems	en
dc.subject.other	Earnings	en
dc.subject.other	Profitability	en
dc.subject.other	Servers	en
dc.subject.other	Peer to peer networks	en
dc.title	A budget-based cost-effective incentive model	en
heal.type	conferenceItem	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1109/ICPPW.2009.30	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/ICPPW.2009.30	en
heal.identifier.secondary	5364804	en
heal.publicationDate	2009	en
heal.abstract	Incentives play an important role in BitTorrent-like P2P networks, motivating users to contribute to others to achieve faster average download time for all peers. Recent related studies reveal that two problems remain unresolved in most popular incentive mechanisms for BitTorrent-like systems: 1) incompleteness: contributions are not entirely considered, and 2) unfairness: accumulated contributions are not considered. To solve these two problems, a budget-based incentive mechanism is here proposed. First, the lifetime of a peer is divided into three phases, and a peer's workload model is defined by analyzing the peer's behavior in different phases. Second, based on the entire contributions derived from workload, the peer's profit model is defined. Third, a method is proposed which enables users to create profit budgets empirically. Finally, a new budget-based priority unchoking algorithm is presented which considers the entirety of peers' past, current, and future contributions. It is demonstrated here that the budget-based incentive mechanism leads the system to market equilibrium. To test the effectiveness of the mechanism, a BitTorrent client coupled with TCP protocol analysis tools was run to collect real data and empirically parameterize the profit model. Then a modification to the BitTorrent protocol was implemented and evaluated, in which peers reward one another with profits from contributions. Simulations demonstrate that this incentive mechanism yields faster average download times and higher mean download rates compared with the tit-for-tat mechanism. © 2009 IEEE.	en
heal.journalName	Proceedings of the International Conference on Parallel Processing Workshops	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1109/ICPPW.2009.30	en
dc.identifier.spage	449	en
dc.identifier.epage	456	en