Games among long and short term electricity producers and users

Kakogiannis, NC; Kontogiorgos, P; Sarri, E; Papavassilopoulos, GP

dc.contributor.author	Kakogiannis, NC	en
dc.contributor.author	Kontogiorgos, P	en
dc.contributor.author	Sarri, E	en
dc.contributor.author	Papavassilopoulos, GP	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T02:52:41Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T02:52:41Z
dc.date.issued	2010	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/35994
dc.subject	Energy optimization cost	en
dc.subject	Equilibrium	en
dc.subject	Game theory	en
dc.subject	Major player	en
dc.subject	Minor players	en
dc.subject	Nash	en
dc.subject.other	Energy optimization cost	en
dc.subject.other	Equilibrium	en
dc.subject.other	Major player	en
dc.subject.other	Minor players	en
dc.subject.other	Nash	en
dc.subject.other	Costs	en
dc.subject.other	Dynamic programming	en
dc.subject.other	Electric power generation	en
dc.subject.other	Electric utilities	en
dc.subject.other	Energy conversion	en
dc.subject.other	Equations of state	en
dc.subject.other	Optimization	en
dc.subject.other	Phase equilibria	en
dc.subject.other	Solar energy	en
dc.subject.other	Solar power generation	en
dc.subject.other	Game theory	en
dc.title	Games among long and short term electricity producers and users	en
heal.type	conferenceItem	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1049/cp.2010.0930	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/cp.2010.0930	en
heal.publicationDate	2010	en
heal.abstract	We consider a system that consists of a major player infinite time horizon and minor players remaining in the system for overlapping and different finite time periods and with different quality features. We study how they interact among themselves (horizontal interaction), and with the major player respectively (vertical interaction), via their decisions /strategies and the impact of the length of the time interval that the minor players remain in the system. In this paper this time is various and we study how this feature influences the cost of the major player and the cost of the minor players. Our major player is the PPC (Public Power Corporation) and the minor players are the energy consumers (houses, industries etc.) or renewable energy producers (for example photovoltaic solar energy producers). We employ the basic game theoretic Nash solution. The optimal equilibrium (the decisions/strategies of the minor players and of the major player) will result in a dual target: global system minimum cost and individual best performance. Our game is dynamic, deterministic and evolves in discrete time. The equilibriums we consider satisfy the Dynamic Programming Principle and are thus ""robust"" in the presence of noise in the state equation.	en
heal.journalName	IET Conference Publications	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1049/cp.2010.0930	en
dc.identifier.volume	2010	en
dc.identifier.issue	572 CP	en