Externalities among advertisers in sponsored search

Fotakis, D; Krysta, P; Telelis, O

dc.contributor.author	Fotakis, D	en
dc.contributor.author	Krysta, P	en
dc.contributor.author	Telelis, O	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T02:53:17Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T02:53:17Z
dc.date.issued	2011	en
dc.identifier.issn	03029743	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/36208
dc.subject.other	Click-through rate	en
dc.subject.other	Computational model	en
dc.subject.other	Computational results	en
dc.subject.other	Hardness of approximation	en
dc.subject.other	Negative correlation	en
dc.subject.other	Polynomial-time	en
dc.subject.other	Price mechanism	en
dc.subject.other	Relative order	en
dc.subject.other	Social welfare maximization	en
dc.subject.other	Sponsored searches	en
dc.subject.other	Winner determination problem	en
dc.subject.other	Game theory	en
dc.subject.other	Polynomial approximation	en
dc.subject.other	Approximation algorithms	en
dc.title	Externalities among advertisers in sponsored search	en
heal.type	conferenceItem	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_11	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_11	en
heal.publicationDate	2011	en
heal.abstract	We introduce a novel computational model for single-keyword auctions in sponsored search, which models explicitly externalities among advertisers, an aspect that has not been fully reflected in the existing models, and is known to affect the behavior of real advertisers. Our model takes into account both positive and negative correlations between any pair of advertisers, so that the click-through rate of an ad depends on the identity, relative order and distance of other ads appearing in the advertisements list. In the proposed model we present several computational results concerning the Winner Determination problem for Social Welfare maximization. These include hardness of approximation and polynomial time exact and approximation algorithms. We conclude with an evaluation of the Generalized Second Price mechanism in presence of externalities. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.	en
heal.journalName	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1007/978-3-642-24829-0_11	en
dc.identifier.volume	6982 LNCS	en
dc.identifier.spage	105	en
dc.identifier.epage	116	en