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On a noncooperative model for wavelength assignment in multifiber optical networks

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dc.contributor.author Bampas, E en
dc.contributor.author Pagourtzis, A en
dc.contributor.author Pierrakos, G en
dc.contributor.author Potika, K en
dc.date.accessioned 2014-03-01T02:53:58Z
dc.date.available 2014-03-01T02:53:58Z
dc.date.issued 2012 en
dc.identifier.issn 10636692 en
dc.identifier.uri https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/36505
dc.subject Bottleneck games en
dc.subject multifiber optical networks en
dc.subject noncooperative games en
dc.subject path multicoloring en
dc.subject price of anarchy en
dc.subject selfish wavelength assignment en
dc.subject.other Bottleneck games en
dc.subject.other Multicoloring en
dc.subject.other Multifiber optical networks en
dc.subject.other Noncooperative game en
dc.subject.other Price of anarchy en
dc.subject.other Wavelength assignment en
dc.subject.other Cost benefit analysis en
dc.subject.other Costs en
dc.subject.other Electric network topology en
dc.subject.other Game theory en
dc.subject.other Wavelength en
dc.subject.other Fiber optic networks en
dc.title On a noncooperative model for wavelength assignment in multifiber optical networks en
heal.type conferenceItem en
heal.identifier.primary 10.1109/TNET.2011.2173948 en
heal.identifier.secondary http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2011.2173948 en
heal.identifier.secondary 6072290 en
heal.publicationDate 2012 en
heal.abstract We propose and investigate Selfish Path MultiColoring games as a natural model for noncooperative wavelength assignment in multifiber optical networks. In this setting, we view the wavelength assignment process as a strategic game in which each communication request selfishly chooses a wavelength in an effort to minimize the maximum congestion that it encounters on the chosen wavelength. We measure the cost of a certain wavelength assignment as the maximum, among all physical links, number of parallel fibers employed by this assignment. We start by settling questions related to the existence and computation of and convergence to pure Nash equilibria in these games. Our main contribution is a thorough analysis of the price of anarchy of such games, that is, the worst-case ratio between the cost of a Nash equilibrium and the optimal cost. We first provide upper bounds on the price of anarchy for games defined on general network topologies. Along the way, we obtain an upper bound of 2 for games defined on star networks. We next show that our bounds are tight even in the case of tree networks of maximum degree 3, leading to nonconstant price of anarchy for such topologies. In contrast, for network topologies of maximum degree 2, the quality of the solutions obtained by selfish wavelength assignment is much more satisfactory: We prove that the price of anarchy is bounded by 4 for a large class of practically interesting games defined on ring networks. © 2012 IEEE. en
heal.journalName IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking en
dc.identifier.doi 10.1109/TNET.2011.2173948 en
dc.identifier.volume 20 en
dc.identifier.issue 4 en
dc.identifier.spage 1125 en
dc.identifier.epage 1137 en


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