On a noncooperative model for wavelength assignment in multifiber optical networks

Bampas, E; Pagourtzis, A; Pierrakos, G; Potika, K

dc.contributor.author	Bampas, E	en
dc.contributor.author	Pagourtzis, A	en
dc.contributor.author	Pierrakos, G	en
dc.contributor.author	Potika, K	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T02:53:58Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T02:53:58Z
dc.date.issued	2012	en
dc.identifier.issn	10636692	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/36505
dc.subject	Bottleneck games	en
dc.subject	multifiber optical networks	en
dc.subject	noncooperative games	en
dc.subject	path multicoloring	en
dc.subject	price of anarchy	en
dc.subject	selfish wavelength assignment	en
dc.subject.other	Bottleneck games	en
dc.subject.other	Multicoloring	en
dc.subject.other	Multifiber optical networks	en
dc.subject.other	Noncooperative game	en
dc.subject.other	Price of anarchy	en
dc.subject.other	Wavelength assignment	en
dc.subject.other	Cost benefit analysis	en
dc.subject.other	Costs	en
dc.subject.other	Electric network topology	en
dc.subject.other	Game theory	en
dc.subject.other	Wavelength	en
dc.subject.other	Fiber optic networks	en
dc.title	On a noncooperative model for wavelength assignment in multifiber optical networks	en
heal.type	conferenceItem	en
heal.identifier.primary	10.1109/TNET.2011.2173948	en
heal.identifier.secondary	http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TNET.2011.2173948	en
heal.identifier.secondary	6072290	en
heal.publicationDate	2012	en
heal.abstract	We propose and investigate Selfish Path MultiColoring games as a natural model for noncooperative wavelength assignment in multifiber optical networks. In this setting, we view the wavelength assignment process as a strategic game in which each communication request selfishly chooses a wavelength in an effort to minimize the maximum congestion that it encounters on the chosen wavelength. We measure the cost of a certain wavelength assignment as the maximum, among all physical links, number of parallel fibers employed by this assignment. We start by settling questions related to the existence and computation of and convergence to pure Nash equilibria in these games. Our main contribution is a thorough analysis of the price of anarchy of such games, that is, the worst-case ratio between the cost of a Nash equilibrium and the optimal cost. We first provide upper bounds on the price of anarchy for games defined on general network topologies. Along the way, we obtain an upper bound of 2 for games defined on star networks. We next show that our bounds are tight even in the case of tree networks of maximum degree 3, leading to nonconstant price of anarchy for such topologies. In contrast, for network topologies of maximum degree 2, the quality of the solutions obtained by selfish wavelength assignment is much more satisfactory: We prove that the price of anarchy is bounded by 4 for a large class of practically interesting games defined on ring networks. © 2012 IEEE.	en
heal.journalName	IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1109/TNET.2011.2173948	en
dc.identifier.volume	20	en
dc.identifier.issue	4	en
dc.identifier.spage	1125	en
dc.identifier.epage	1137	en