Σχεδιασμός φιλαληθών μηχανισμών για προβλήματα χωροθέτησης

Μονάχου, Φαίδρα Γεωργία; Monachou, Faidra Georgia

dc.contributor.author	Μονάχου, Φαίδρα Γεωργία	el
dc.contributor.author	Monachou, Faidra Georgia	en
dc.date.accessioned	2016-03-09T10:39:53Z
dc.date.available	2016-03-09T10:39:53Z
dc.date.issued	2016-03-09
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/42115
dc.identifier.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.26240/heal.ntua.11902
dc.rights	Αναφορά Δημιουργού-Μη Εμπορική Χρήση-Όχι Παράγωγα Έργα 3.0 Ελλάδα	*
dc.rights	Αναφορά Δημιουργού-Μη Εμπορική Χρήση-Όχι Παράγωγα Έργα 3.0 Ελλάδα	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/gr/	*
dc.subject	Χωροθέτηση	el
dc.subject	Σχεδιασμός μηχανισμών	el
dc.subject	Φιλαλήθεις μηχανισμοί	el
dc.subject	Money burning	en
dc.subject	Facility location	el
dc.subject	Mechanism design	el
dc.subject	Algorithmic game theory	el
dc.subject	Αλγοριθμική θεωρία παιγνίων	el
dc.subject	Optimal social cost	el
dc.subject	Βελτιστοποίηση κοινωνικού κόστους	el
dc.title	Σχεδιασμός φιλαληθών μηχανισμών για προβλήματα χωροθέτησης	el
dc.title	Money burning mechanism design for facility location	en
heal.type	bachelorThesis
heal.classification	Αλγοριθμική θεωρία παιγνίων	el
heal.classification	Αλγόριθμοι	el
heal.language	en
heal.access	free
heal.recordProvider	ntua	el
heal.publicationDate	2015-11-03
heal.abstract	In this thesis, we study Facility Location problems from a mechanism design perspective. We focus on games, where a number of facilities that provide a certain type of service, are placed in a metric space based on the demands reported by strategic agents. The agents seek to minimize their connection cost, namely the product of their demand times the distance of their location to the nearest facility, and may misreport their demand. We are interested in mechanisms that are truthful, i.e. ensure that no agent can benefit from misreporting his demand, do not resort to monetary transfers, and approximate the optimal social cost. We survey recent results in Mechanism De- sign without Money for Facility Location problems. We also survey Money Burning Mechanism Design, where the payments charged to the agents are not in the form of monetary transfers, but service degradation. We then develop an approach to designing both deterministic and randomized truthful mechanisms for our Facility Location game, using a money burning technique. We present our results for the real line setting, as well as general metric spaces.	en
heal.advisorName	Φωτάκης, Δημήτριος	el
heal.committeeMemberName	Φωτάκης, Δημήτριος	el
heal.committeeMemberName	Αφράτη, Φώτω	el
heal.committeeMemberName	Παπασπύρου, Νικόλαος	el
heal.academicPublisher	Εθνικό Μετσόβιο Πολυτεχνείο. Σχολή Ηλεκτρολόγων Μηχανικών και Μηχανικών Υπολογιστών	el
heal.academicPublisherID	ntua
heal.numberOfPages	76 σ.	el
heal.fullTextAvailability	true