Μεγιστοποίηση κέρδους σε δημοπρασίες αναβαλλόμενης αποδοχής

Σουμαλιάς, Ερμής Νικηφόρος; Soumalias, Ermis Nikiforos

dc.contributor.author	Σουμαλιάς, Ερμής Νικηφόρος	el
dc.contributor.author	Soumalias, Ermis Nikiforos	en
dc.date.accessioned	2020-12-21T13:22:55Z
dc.date.available	2020-12-21T13:22:55Z
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/52645
dc.identifier.uri	http://dx.doi.org/10.26240/heal.ntua.20343
dc.rights	Default License
dc.rights	Αναφορά Δημιουργού - Παρόμοια Διανομή 3.0 Ελλάδα	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/gr/	*
dc.subject	Αλγοριθμική Θεωρία Παιγνίων	el
dc.subject	Σχεδίαση μηχανισμών	el
dc.subject	Μεγιστοποίηση κέρδους	el
dc.subject	Δημοπρασίες αναβαλλόμενης αποδοχής	el
dc.subject	Δειγματική πολυπλοκότητα	el
dc.subject	Algorithmic Game Theory	en
dc.subject	Deferred-acceptance auctions	en
dc.subject	Mechanism design	en
dc.subject	Revenue maximization	en
dc.subject	Sample complexity	en
dc.title	Μεγιστοποίηση κέρδους σε δημοπρασίες αναβαλλόμενης αποδοχής	el
dc.title	Profit Maximization in Deferred-Acceptance Auctions	en
heal.type	bachelorThesis
heal.classification	Αλγόριθμοι	el
heal.classification	Αλγοριθμική Θεωρία Παιγνίων	el
heal.classification	Σχεδίαση Μηχανισμών	el
heal.language	el
heal.language	en
heal.access	free
heal.recordProvider	ntua	el
heal.publicationDate	2020-09-15
heal.abstract	In this thesis we study the problem of revenue maximization for multi-unit deferred-acceptance auctions. Deferred-acceptance auctions have been studied extensively, but mostly for the objective of social welfare, and most studies have followed a worst case analysis approach. In this thesis our aim is to design deferred-acceptance auctions that, given some samples of the players' valuation distributions, achieve expected revenue close to optimal. We focus on two distinct environments, a single-parameter one, multi-unit auctions with bidders with additive valuation functions, and a multi-parameter one, multi-unit auctions with bidders with submodular valuation functions.	en
heal.abstract	In this thesis we study the problem of revenue maximization for multi-unit deferred-acceptance auctions. Deferred-acceptance auctions have been studied extensively, but mostly for the objective of social welfare, and most studies have followed a worst case analysis approach. In this thesis our aim is to design deferred-acceptance auctions that, given some samples of the players' valuation distributions, achieve expected revenue close to optimal. We focus on two distinct environments, a single-parameter one, multi-unit auctions with bidders with additive valuation functions, and a multi-parameter one, multi-unit auctions with bidders with submodular valuation functions.	en
heal.advisorName	Fotakis, Dimitris	en
heal.committeeMemberName	Fotakis, Dimitris	en
heal.committeeMemberName	Markakis, Evangelos	en
heal.committeeMemberName	Pagourtzis, Aris	en
heal.academicPublisher	Εθνικό Μετσόβιο Πολυτεχνείο. Σχολή Ηλεκτρολόγων Μηχανικών και Μηχανικών Υπολογιστών. Τομέας Τεχνολογίας Πληροφορικής και Υπολογιστών. Εργαστήριο Λογικής και Επιστήμης Υπολογισμών	el
heal.academicPublisherID	ntua
heal.numberOfPages	109 σ.	el
heal.fullTextAvailability	false
heal.fullTextAvailability	false
heal.fullTextAvailability	false