heal.abstract |
The byzantine agreement problem is one of the most fundamental research areas in the field of fault-tolerant distributed algorithms. While the problem has attracted the interest of the scientific community the last years due to the development of blockchain technologies and cryptocurrencies, the bulk of the literature studies the cases of static participation and honest majority. In this work, we present the first, to our knowledge, byzantine Broadcast protocol (where the parties shall agree on the input value of designated sender), which tolerates any number of corruptions in the unknown participants model, where the parties have no clue about the set of actual participants nor for their number. Our solution is based on the main idea of the corresponding protocol in the known participants model, where in every round the parties accept an input value of the sender only if they receive as many signatures in support of it as the round number. In particular, we modify appropriately this protocol, so then in every round the parties accept the active participation of some other party only it they receive as many signatures in support of it from as many parties as the round number, but only from parties that they have already accepted in the previous rounds. Hence, we we construct a new protocol in the unknown participants model which achieves agreement among the parties on a subset of them, which contains all honest parties (the ones which do not deviate from the protocol). In addition, we extend our protocol, so then the parties agree on an input value for each one of the parties of this commonly agreed party set. In this way, our solution of byzantine Broadcast is an immediate application of this extended protocol. Finally, relying once again on corresponding results in the known participants model, we prove that any protocol that solves byzantine Broadcast in the unknown participants model with the same resilience requires as many communication rounds in the worst case as the number of active parties. Thus, we show that our protocol, which requires the same number of rounds as the number of parties, is optimal in terms of its worst-case round complexity |
en |