Coordination of multi-agents with a revenuecost- sharing mechanism: A cooperative game theory approach

Karmperis, AC; Aravossis, K; Sotirchos, A; Tatsiopoulos, IP

dc.contributor.author	Karmperis, AC	en
dc.contributor.author	Aravossis, K	en
dc.contributor.author	Sotirchos, A	en
dc.contributor.author	Tatsiopoulos, IP	en
dc.date.accessioned	2014-03-01T02:08:34Z
dc.date.available	2014-03-01T02:08:34Z
dc.date.issued	2012	en
dc.identifier.issn	19980140	en
dc.identifier.uri	https://dspace.lib.ntua.gr/xmlui/handle/123456789/29672
dc.relation.uri	http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-84857331285&partnerID=40&md5=28dec352eaf09503161aee3680438ac1	en
dc.subject	Coalitions	en
dc.subject	Cooperative game	en
dc.subject	Multi-agents	en
dc.subject	Revenuecost- sharing mechanism	en
dc.title	Coordination of multi-agents with a revenuecost- sharing mechanism: A cooperative game theory approach	en
heal.type	journalArticle	en
heal.publicationDate	2012	en
heal.abstract	In this paper we focus on the coordination of multiagents through a revenue-cost-sharing mechanism. We consider a grand-coalition consisting of finite agents, who undertake part of the costs individually, while the remaining costs C and the total revenues R are shared between them with a revenue-cost-sharing contract. We introduce a novel approach in the form of a cooperative game for a finite set of agents N and we estimate the finite set of possible solutions. Specifically, each of these solutions can be used for the coordination of the multi-agents, as it allocates the grand-coalition's profits and risks equally among them. A computation algorithm is developed and illustrated in a numerical example for the coordination of a grand-coalition with nine individual agents.	en
heal.journalName	International Journal of Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences	en
dc.identifier.volume	6	en
dc.identifier.issue	1	en
dc.identifier.spage	209	en
dc.identifier.epage	221	en